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Introduction
The end of systemic bipolarity and, thus, of superpower overlay in various regions of the world has sparked a debate about the role of these regions and their core powers in the new, unipolar order.1 Regional powers have been studied both as facilitators of and obstacles to regional institutionalization, and their role as middle or emerging powers in global governance and international institutions has been discussed (Pedersen: 2002) .2 Other research has looked more closely at the regional level and discussed the subsystemic emergence and maintenance of "security complexes" dominated by one state (Buzan and Waever: 2003, Lake: 1997) . Despite these and manifold previous debates, theories and concepts that are tied to the regional level of analysis are nevertheless in short supply. While, for instance, the idea of "regional hegemony" is frequently used to analyze or describe the roles and behavior of states such as South Africa or Brazil, the literature has largely failed to properly incorporate "the region" into the concept of hegemony.
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I would like to thank Dr. Louise Fawcett, Dr. Gero Erdmann, and the members of the Regional Powers Network at the GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies for their useful, constructive comments. Prys: Regional Hegemony: South Africa, Zimbabwe and "Quiet Diplomacy" This article argues that this is among the key reasons that states categorized as regional hegemons often do not act according to what is generally expected from them: they do not provide public goods, such as order and stability, nor do they have an extraordinary impact on the behavior of other states in their region. States such as South Africa that are preponderant across a vast range of indicators within their regions-southern Africa in the case of South Africa-frequently seem to struggle to transform these advantages into actual influence. 3 Chris Alden and Mills Soko wonder, for instance, about the paradox of South Africa's "singular failure in the case of the management of the Zimbabwean crisis" to achieve some of the key objectives attributed to hegemons (Alden and Soko 2005: 388) . Across the literature we find that regional powers are a bit of a "let-down" and that the concept of regional hegemony in particular is often rejected (Adekeye and Landsberg 2002 , Mitra 2003 , Naidu 2003 , Alden and Schoeman 2003 , Emmers 2005 ).
This article looks at regional hegemony and the ambivalence of the foreign policy of potential regional hegemons through the prism of South Africa's Zimbabwe policy. Hegemony is preferred over other terms as it encompasses a particular power constellation in hierarchical systems which is qualitatively different from leadership and is not included in the terms "regional great power," "emerging regional power," or others. Moreover, the concept is in fact commonly used in contemporary analyses of regional relations and thus needs to be better understood to be of any value. In the earlier stages of the discipline of international relations the term was in fact used to describe a certain type of big state-small state relationship, across different levels of analysis and even referring to bilateral relations, rather than being applicable to the United States only (Triepel 1938 , Perlman 1991 .
While this article will thus contribute empirically to a better understanding of South Africa's Zimbabwe policy, its core interest is a conceptual one. First, a conceptual tool will be provided to make more sense of the ambiguous situation in which South Africa, as a regional hegemon, finds itself. The key addition is that the proposed conceptualization of regional hegemony takes into account the embeddedness of regions and, thus, of the regional hegemon in the international system, which has a significant impact on how regional hegemons can exercise their
power and to what extent they have an impact on the region. Definitions of regional hegemony are offered in the literature. For instance, Myers defines regional hegemons as "states which possess sufficient power to dominate subordinate state systems." 4 His publication is based on a realist approach, which neglects both the internal workings of such a regional order and as-3 Southern Africa, as defined through membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is the reference region. Only in southern Africa does South Africa have a unique material advantage; no second or third competitor in terms of size of population and GDP is present. Southern Africa also has a distinctive regional organization and a dense, historically based network of transport and other infrastructure as well as patterns of migration that extend within the boundaries of the region. Quarterly 12, No. 3 (1968) . 7 pects such as acceptance, followership and the role of ideas, which are central to most other understandings of hegemony. No differentiation is made between regional and global hegemony, and no particular rules for hegemony on the regional level are developed. Colin Elman and John Mearsheimer understand regional hegemony as a second best to unachievable global hegemony and define it as "dominance of the area in which the great power is located." 5 According to their offensive realist view, there can only be one regional hegemon in the world at any time. The regional level of analysis in itself is, as in most neorealist thinking, insignificant.
This paper argues that regional hegemons play a dual role at the nexus of regional and global politics and thus have to accomplish (at least) two main tasks: the exclusion of external actors from their "sphere of influence" as well as the accommodation of the same actors in order to achieve both their global and regional foreign policy goals. Before introducing the notion of embeddedness, the article will, as a second contribution, operationalize hegemony in a way that makes it applicable to very concrete cases and situations. While, without doubt, the notion of hegemony has been widely discussed, also in terms of its regional adaptation, most definitions remain abstract, referring to the condition or shape of the system as a whole rather than the concrete consequences for the actors' foreign policy or the relations between two or more states. 6 In essence, the aim here is to show that an inappropriate application of general hegemony theories has led to misdirected expectations of what regional powers, in the developing world in general and South Africa in particular, can and want to achieve within their regions. By taking a deliberately regional approach, this article will suggest how South Africa's policies in response to the Zimbabwean crisis correspond to what we should expect from a regional hegemon.
Reconceptualizing Regional Hegemony
At the core of this "reconceptualization" of regional hegemony lies the pragmatic focus on commonalities among the many different definitions and theories of hegemony (Prys 2008 , Joseph 2008 , Rapkin 1990 gemony is understood as a political order in which one way of thinking, the most powerful one, dominates, thus minimizing coercion (Joseph 2008 : 109, Showstack Sassoon 1982 This article proposes that the three dimensions of "perception," "projection," and "provision" adequately describe what differentiates a hegemonic relationship from other forms of hierarchical power relations, such as domination or imperialism. These three dimensions are necessary and, in combination with the anterior condition of material preponderance, jointly sufficient for constituting hegemony. 8 Some amendments, however, have to be made to capture the regional perspective on hegemony. We have to, for instance, consider that regional public goods might not always correspond to typically hegemonic global public goods such as the provision of free trade and economic stability. 9 The picture is further complicated by the fact that regional systems are by definition open, politically contingent systems that are embedded in the larger global system. Their borders are permeable for both internal and external actors, which has consequences for both the concept and the actual exercise of regional hegemony. The article therefore includes a discussion of the consequences of the regionality of hegemony in its conceptualization of regional hegemony.
Perceptions
The dimension of perceptions includes both the self-perception of the regional hegemon and the perceptions of the respective secondary powers of the region. Most conceptualizations of hegemony take it for granted that in order for a state to be hegemonic it needs to possess the political willingness to be so; they do not take into account, for example, the limits within which this willingness can be explicitly addressed by the regional power. More importantly, a focus on "willingness" forces us to simply assume an active pursuit of a hegemonic role by definition, which does not leave room for the possibility that a regional power is pushed into assuming a hegemonic role by external actors, particularly in the post-cold war period where the absence of superpower rivalry has left a "power vacuum" in many regions of the world (Myers 1990: 3) . Rather than an explicit formulation of a willingness to lead, we will look at the self-conception of the regional hegemons. This means that while on the one hand we acknowledge that a certain readiness and capacity to carry the "burdens of hegemony" has to present, we recognize this does not have to go hand in hand with explicit plans, strategies, or ambitions for regional leadership. In the case of India, for example, one can argue that the regional predominance is regarded as a burden, yet the Indian government is still aware of its outstanding resources in comparison to its smaller neighbors and is prepared to act upon it. 10 8 Empirically, the boundaries between "projection" and "perception" are partially blurred. As they are fundamentally different features of hegemony, however, they need to be kept analytically separate. In contrast, this discussion looks at references to "special responsibilities" (Holsti 1970: 261) :
an emphasis on the country's own unique historic or other experiences or, in other words, a sense of exceptionalism, particularly in comparison with the neighboring states (Lipset 1996: 18 Most theories of hegemony assume that there is no hegemony without "followership." Cooper and Higgott define followership as an "intertwining of the followers" interests with those of a leader, which means that "these followers are likely not simply to defer and acquiesce to the leader, but to willingly follow" (Cooper/Higgott/Nossall 1991: 397-8 ). Yet, this needs to be put into perspective. In general, states are hesitant to "joyfully embrace" the lead of others (Triepel 1938: 144-5) . Most of the time, the acceptance of a hegemon is founded on utility or necessity and, above all, on the secondary states' realization of their own weaknesses. Consent is not required from every single unit in the system. Resistance to or fear and suspicion of the materially privileged state, both of which are often historically anchored, are features in many hierarchically ordered regions. With this in mind, we find that "regional acceptance" of the hegemon's special role and the consequential demands on it to ways in Nepal and continues to do so through community-level grants provided through the Indian Embassy in Nepal. Priyanka Singh, India-Nepal Relations: Rickety Roadmap, in: World Focus 317, No. 27 (2006 act in accordance with that role are more appropriate and empirically observable features of regional hegemony, particularly if we take into account that secondary states could also decide to "balance" or contain the regional power with the help of outsiders (Ayoob 1999: 251-2) . Indicators for level of acceptance are, for instance, the acceptance of help from the regional hegemon by the secondary state rather than from extra-regional actors, and also the demands on the regional power to take on more responsibility, particularly in financial and administrative issues. On the societal level, regional hegemons often have an appeal in terms of cultural products and educational institutions. Methodologically, these perceptions will also be assessed through an analysis of the speeches and statements of regional governmental leaders and other relevant primary and secondary resources. 13
Projection
The projection of values and interests, rather than their imposition, is another defining feature of regional hegemony. Projection is generally associated with a process of "socialization." The study of the socialization of the secondary states into accepting the values and rules of the hegemon as the "right thing to do" is challenged by two factors (Checkel 2005: 804) . First, socialization is, above all, a long-term process, which is not always deliberate but rather "happens" over time, whether stimulated by an underlying, deliberate strategy or by a series of unintentional consequences. Second, what we generally perceive as socialization is a very difficult, little understood, and under-studied subject. Most studies that apply theories of socialization in the realm of international politics are informed by a constructivist research program which often tends to neglect the more power-political aspects of the change in substantive beliefs, the key factor in hegemonic socialization. Ikenberry and Kupchan assume that the best and probably only way to go about "measuring" hegemonic socialization is through a "nuanced reading of history and efforts to infer beliefs from statements and behaviours" (Ikenberry/Kupchan 1990: 294) . This is not feasible for a study of contemporary events. Instead, this paper proposes to assess hegemonic projection by focusing on the specific activities of the hegemon that promote its own vision and values for the region, such as the establishment of institutions and agendasetting within those institutions; mediation of conflicts; and financial assistance and, if relevant, the conditions attached to it. A more immediate form of value projection is the direct construction of a similar political system in the secondary states. 14 The advantage of focusing
13
While extended travels to other southern African countries were not part of this research, I have, for instance, met a few southern Africans residing and working in South Africa. In addition, secondary resources will be drawn upon in assessing the perception of and the demands on South Africa by its neighbors (see n.18 above). on projection rather than socialization is that we can assess the hegemonic qualities of a specific interaction in a specific situation. While this, obviously, breaks hegemony down into a matter of singular events, it seems be the only way to study the consequences of hegemony in particular cases, such as South Africa's Zimbabwe policy. Projection will be assessed in two steps. The discussion will first look at the more concrete interests of South Africa with regard to the Zimbabwean crisis; second, it will evaluate whether attempts have been made to project these interests not only on Zimbabwe but also on the other South African Development Community (SADC) members.
Provision
Lastly, hegemony, whether regional or global, is differentiated from other forms of hierarchical power relations by a unilateral provision of public goods. Conventional theories of hegemony associate very specific goods with a hegemonic order, such as an open trading system and the maintenance of a structure of exchange rates, and expect the hegemon to serve as a "lender of last resort" (Kindleberger 1986: 841) . The goods that regional hegemons provide may be very different and context specific, which means that the criteria of nonexclusiveness and nonrivalry, which are the defining features of a public good, must be applied at this level without a preconception of what specific types of goods might be provided. 15 Also, while, for instance, the theory of hegemonic stability links political willingness with a quasi-automatic production of public goods, public goods provision should be seen and assessed independently from perception and projection. Regional hegemons might also be pressured into providing these goods, by inside or outside actors, while being unwilling to do so. These goods might, for instance, include the provision of a regional identity, or a hub for identification and solidarity, but they could also include more concrete examples such as the creation of consensus over a course of action, the provision of transport and infrastructure or of regional security through enhanced military capacity, or other ways of enabling regional and domestic stability and economic progress (Ferroni 1999) . Mere financial assistance will, however, be discussed in the dimension of projection as it is exclusive, rival, and often conditional. No. 3 (1996) ; John G. Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and the Persistence of American Hegemony, in: International Security 23, No. 3 (1998) . 15 There can also be "impure" public goods that only partly meet the criteria of nonexclusiveness and nonrivalry. However, "this expanded conception of public goods is widely accepted in the literature. 
The Regionality of Hegemony-the Outside-in and Inside-out Dimensions
The embeddedness of regions in the international system has an important impact on how regional hegemons exercise their power. 16 Obviously, this is an issue with which regional hegemons around the world are confronted. Nevertheless, it has remained surprisingly absent in the literature on regions and regional power. Embeddedness can offer both opportunities and constraints to the regional power's hegemonic position. First of all, it suggests a two-way dynamic in which we have to consider not only external actors' impact on the region, but also the attempts of regional powers, for instance, to use their regional predominance as a stepping-stone to a broader global role while simultaneously trying to fend off external intrusion into their own region. Regional hegemons thus pursue their foreign policy goals on both the regional and the global level, with the strategic requirements for each level at times contradicting each other.
With regard to outsiders' influence on regional hegemony, the idea of systemic pressure and superpower overlay has certainly played an important role in realist theories and, for instance, in regional security complex approaches (Buzan and Waever 2003: 61) . The central example of the impact of these pressures is the containment of the regional power by a great power through the support and economic and/or military backing of the regional power's main competitor in the region (Ibid.: 46-7). This article takes, however, a broader perspective on the outside-in dimension of regional hegemony or, in other words, on the impact that the global level can have on regional dynamics. External actors, including states and international organizations, can also lend support to the regional hegemon, by acknowledging its special position, by providing privileged access to global multilateral institutions, or by raising expectations on the regional hegemon to take care of its own backyard. This global support has multiple effects on the regional hegemon's capacities. On the one hand, privileged access to the "global playing field" can allow the regional hegemon to influence decision making that will affect the region. On the other hand, treatment as representative or as natural regional leader by external actors can also impact negatively on regional relations, for example, by arousing jealousy and suspicion (Alden/Vieira 2005 : 1081 .
The inside-out dimension encompasses the way in which the regional power itself deals with its embeddedness and how it relates to the global level. The regional hegemon has, in principle, two key options. First, it can use the region as a "stepping stone." In this case, it will likely try to use its regional predominance as a springboard for a broader global role, for instance, by presenting itself as the representative of a specific region of the world and thus as a potential member of the UN Security Council. These global ambitions, again, can have a
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The term embeddedness is borrowed from systems theory and refers to the status of an actor or a subsystem nested within another system. It is sometimes discussed with respect to the EU's embeddedness in the international system when looking at the effects of international systemic pressures on the institutions of the EU. corrupting effect on the predominant role of the regional hegemon and its perceived, desired, or factual leadership in the region (Zimmermann 1972: 19) . The second, and potentially contrary, option is an emphasis on the boundaries of the region in an effort to differentiate and "gatekeep" the region in order to ensure the regional hegemon's role as the primus and to strengthen its exclusive influence on its neighborhood. In previous studies of regional hegemony in southern Africa or elsewhere in the developing world, it has been widely overlooked that these multiple interconnections exist and create constraints and opportunities that differentiate regional hegemony from hegemony at the global level.
South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy
The Zimbabwean "crisis" has been the poster case for many scholars aiming to show how little influence South Africa has in southern Africa and how easily it was "snubbed off" by the elections. This crisis of human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the media, and democracy has damaged South Africa's international "good name," and many claim that South Africa, with its material power advantages in the southern African region, has failed Zimbabwe.
South Africa is accused of having "undermined any speedy resolution of the problem" by basing its diplomacy on a "public excusing of Mugabe's human rights record" (Taylor 2002: 345 At first, the term quiet/silent diplomacy was embraced by the South African government: "The President engages the President of Zimbabwe in silent diplomacy and any public pronouncements on the detail of discussions might be counterproductive." South African National Assembly, Parliamentary Question No. 618 for clude behind the scene engagements, secret negotiations, and subtle coaxing (Dlamini 2001: 171) . In the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe, this refers, for example, to a series of bilateral meetings between the presidents and senior officials, South Africa's defense of Zimbabwe from criticism in international organizations, the endorsement of questionable election results, and the provision of a "lifeline" in terms of financial and energy resources. The stated goal of these policies is to facilitate change within Zimbabwe by the Zimbabweans themselves rather than imposing it from the outside. Yet, as this policy is by its nature not a public procedure, it has often been perceived as an excuse for inaction in the face of a looming crisis (Taylor 2002: 345 2004: 362) . This article will show that, while all of these points have some explanatory value, we can gain a clearer and more compelling picture of the situation by applying a reconceptualized notion of regional hegemony.
Perception: Self-perception-Exceptionalism and Responsibility
In this section, I consider the self-perception of South Africa's foreign-policy makers with respect to their role in the Zimbabwean crisis. Interviews, official documents, and statements have been used to deduce the extent to which South Africa's self-positioning conforms to this paper's notion of regional hegemony, including the acknowledgment of its special position in the region and a sense of exceptionalism. 20 Overall, one can find a division on the rhetorical level between the emphasis on the role as an "equal partner" in southern Africa and This section focuses on the perceptions of and opinions on the topic that are prevalent among the majority of interviews, statements and documents. The combination of different sources, both spontaneous and official ones, ensures, to the greatest possible extent, a certain verifiability. Specific quotes have been picked according to how well they represented the tone of the discourse on self-perception in South Africa (see n.18 above).
15 the embracing of the country's obvious material preponderance by the political leadership.
As a general rule, however, the self-conception as the responsible and unique actor prevails (Mandela 1993 , DFA 1999 ). Yet, this broad self-perception as a "good international citizen" is sometimes contradicted by South Africa's ambition to be a "good regional citizen" when principles of human rights and democracy clash with South Africa's ambition to place the "concerns and interest of the continent of Africa" at the forefront of its foreign policy choices (Mandela 1993: 87 ). This article argues that, particularly in more spontaneous statements, we can find strong evidence of a sense of responsibility that is tied to South Africa's material advantages and its historical burden rather than to its commitment to universal human rights.
We have all sorts of [national] problem, which we must attend to. But we are better than many African countries. And I think we should not be begrudging in saying: "Let's share a little bit of what we have", to assist with regard to the development of the rest of the continent. And it is a challenge we have got to meet (Mbeki 2003 ).
This view also prevails when the potential influence of global actors that, according to most government officials, do not understand the situation in Zimbabwe as South Africa does is taken into account. Until recently, the South African government rejected the view that its Zimbabwe policy had failed and instead complained that its critics themselves had so far been unsuccessful in furthering a viable alternative (Pahad 2003 Yet, the frequent verbal rejections of a leadership role do not necessarily negate South African regional hegemony. Rather, a "strategy of denial" is adopted. This requires, on the one hand, the emphasis on partnership, sovereignty, and African solidarity. On the other hand, South Africa ensures that it significantly influences the terms of engagement in the case of Zimbabwe by playing the key role in all aspects of regional and international dealings with the crisis.
South Africa uses its power in more subtle ways […] the dominant thing we do is that
on the one hand we want to build partnerships and on the other we subtly want to be in charge of these partnerships. 30
Perception: the Regional Level of Acceptance
South Africa's status as the regional power is, at least in material terms, undeniable, and its neighboring states have to position themselves in a particular way towards this hub in their midst. What differentiates hegemony from domination and force is a certain level of acceptance of that power. This can, on the societal level, take the form of attraction to some of the hegemon's attributes, such as its political system, its social structure, and/or its wealth. This At the same time, we can find that there is an implicit and, at times, explicit recognition of the potentially beneficial impact of South Africa in regional relations which is also reflected in calls by the leading figures of southern Africa upon South Africa to take up its responsibilities as a larger, more resourceful state. For instance, the former Tanzanian president
Julius Nyerere demanded at South Africa's National Assembly that South Africa play a more active role on the continent. He dismissed fears of a Big Brother South Africa and stated that the country's superior comparative power is a responsibility. The country should not hide behind false modesty as isolationism is often an excuse for selfishness (Fabricius 1997 "serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the international affairs of […] Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty" (SADC 2002 (SADC , 2003 . 32 The Times of Zambia commented on April 4, 2005 that "Zimbabwe is neither a member of the EU nor a colony or province of the United States.
It is a member of SADC and a neighbour of South Africa." The US and the EU should support President Mbeki's efforts rather than undermining them.
Two aspects stand out with respect to the regional level of acceptance of South African leadership in the Zimbabwean crisis. First, due to its economic decline, Zimbabwe is, and will increasingly be, in less and less of a position to reject South Africa's offers of both financial help, potentially linked to conditions, and mediation between the government and opposition forces.
Second, neighboring states generally seem to recognize that they benefit not only from South
African involvement in political negotiations with global-level actors but also, regionally, through investment by South African businesses. We can therefore conclude that a feeling of goodwill prevails rather than anti-South Africanism, despite the country's apartheid past. This conclusion has been affirmed in interviews with South African government officials. 33 An opinion poll has also shown that at least in Tanzania 
Projection
In the assessment of projection as a dimension of regional hegemony, we have to deduce, first, the relevant values and interests that South Africa might project; second, who is the target of this projection; and, third, whether or not projection has in fact taken place. TM: I don't know. What I know is that we can't afford a complete collapse of Zimbabwe on our borders, so we've got to try and do whatever we can to assist them to get... BBC: ...he's not listening, is he?
TM: Well he hasn't.
Thus, South Africa's (albeit moderate) efforts could not prevent Zimbabwe from going into a downward spiral of hyperinflation, unemployment, poverty, and international isolation. In Prys: Regional Hegemony: South Africa, Zimbabwe and "Quiet Diplomacy" 21 consequence, it seems obvious to conclude that South Africa's quiet diplomacy has been a failure and that the "President has no influence at all over Mugabe" (Volker 2003 ). Yet, while it would have been normatively desirable to prevent the current difficulties, if not atrocities, we need to be aware not to project our own aspirations onto what the South African government perceives as being in its own interest when we try to understand its approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. Within the South African government it was feared that "megaphone diplomacy," including sanctions and maybe even the involvement of the military, would disrupt any communication between the two states and, consequently, render the situation completely beyond South Africa's grasp. Thus, the choice of quiet diplomacy seems to be, at least from the South African perspective, unavoidable.
Consequently, it is necessary to stop short of an outright rejection of South Africa's hegemonic projection on this issue. First, attempts have been made to influence President Mugabe. Countless meetings, promises and visits by ministers, senior officials and the president himself have aimed to persuade Mugabe to secure fair elections, to restore the rule of law, and to eventually step down. Yet, irrespective of these attempts and against "common sense" Mugabe has rejected all help and decided to cling to power as long as possible. We can seriously doubt that any other actor would have made a stronger impression on President Mugabe. More importantly, and in line with South Africa's broader regional role, the quiet diplomacy approach has allowed the South African government to stay tuned with pro-Zimbabwe sentiment in Africa and to buttress South Africa's status as a leading power. It has also helped to rest the canard that the ANC government is dominated by white interests and thus to claim its legitimacy as an authentic African power. Finally, it softens the impact of the aggressive outreach of South African capital on the continent (Freeman 2005: 152) . This is a very important achievement for a regional hegemon, even if it does not conform to the normatively desirable result in the Zimbabwean crisis.
Provision
In the case of the Zimbabwean crisis, we can again find some contradictions between what is generally perceived as hegemonic public good provision and how South Africa has performed.
At first glance, the key public goods of regional security and regional economic development are both at stake. The regional costs of the crisis are enormous and it seems we cannot help but come to the conclusion that South Africa has failed to provide any regional goods and, by its nonaction, contributed to the impairment of economic stability and collective and individual welfare in southern Africa. Yet, while some form of activism on the part of the regional hegemon to prevent events from getting worse would certainly be desirable, as long as the provided goods are non-rival and non-exclusive in their nature, they do not need to conform to our criteria of justice and order. This article argues that we can find at least three distinctly re-gional public goods provided by South Africa: solidarity against the West and domestic opponents, the prevention of political fallout in the southern Africa region, and SADC unity. In sum, this article highlights the complexity that makes a clear-cut valuation of South Africa's hegemonic qualities difficult. Despite the evidence of regional public good provision presented here, we cannot overlook the damage that has been done to South Africa's and the region's international relations. Besides the more direct economic costs, the region has experienced the steep decline of one of its most important trading partners, and the process of regional integration has been slowed down as a consequence. Nevertheless, the argument that South Africa should have controlled and influenced Zimbabwe in order to conform to a conventional notion of regional hegemony or leadership and to be true to its own values and principles is put into perspective by this more context-specific notion of regional hegemony.
At the beginning of this article, the idea that the embeddedness of regional hegemony in the international system is an essential component in this paper's concept of regional hegemony was developed. The next section will use the empirical evidence of the Zimbabwean case to see whether any of these factors matter and, if so, how.
Outside-in Dimension: Global Expectations, Interference and Support
The first aspect to be considered is the impact of important global actors from outside the region on South Africa's relations with its neighboring states. Hence, we first need to assess the stakes of these actors in the Zimbabwean crisis.
Zimbabwe started to become a concern to the European Union, particularly the UK, and the . This also extends to South Africa's special partnership with the G8. A majority of interviewees acknowledged that while neighboring states will not like the fact that South Africa has this access, they will have to live with it and make the best of it, particularly because, as the government officials interviewed insisted, South Africa argues on behalf of the whole region or continent in these forums. 38 Yet, despite its normative orientation and its emphasis on human rights and democracy in its key foreign policy documents, in this specific case the South African government is rather 35 Other external actors with potential influence in the Zimbabwean crisis are China and Libya. Both have provided economic aid to Zimbabwe that has, at least in part, constrained South Africa in exercising its economic leverage in Zimbabwe. Dowden, however, comes to the conclusion that "while this helps Mugabe it does not provide him with the sort of aid that he needs, let alone a saviour." This savior can, as agreed in the literature, only be South Africa. Richard Dowden, Engaging with Mugabe, in: The Round and European pressures and, instead, to take part in (African) multilateral negotiations, as its regional neighbors expect it to Also, the issue of African allegations of racism by the West is an important factor that impacts negatively on the possibility of South African agency, as it puts South Africa in the uncomfortable position of potentially being labeled a "black" puppet of the predominantly "white" West. Unmistakably, South Africa is faced with competing priorities, and the expected role conflict between global and regional ambitions is, in fact, present. South Africa has clear ambitions to play a global role. It is pursuing a seat on the UN Security Council and has forged alliances with states that it perceives to share its global interests as well as its regional power position within the framework of the India-Brazil-South Africa trilateral alliance (IBSA). This is where the dual role and the tensions that come with it become most virulent. While on the one hand South Africa shares its normative orientations with regard to human rights and democracy with other global actors, namely the European Union and the United States, and has ambitions to play an important role, on the regional level it has to adapt at least in part to the locally prevalent arguments of noninterference and nonintervention in order not to completely alienate its neighbors. A regional hegemon has to strike a fine balance between satisfying these divergent requirements. Inconsistencies are often the result, as manifested, for instance, in South Africa's strong support for NEPAD and its African Peer Review mechanism and its simultaneous protection of Zimbabwe, which seems to break most of the rules embedded in both institutions. This has put South Africa's reputation as a good international citizen and as a reliable state in Africa, as well as its envisaged permanent seat on the UN Security Council, at risk (Spence 2006: 198) .
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Expert interview, Johannesburg, July 6 and 18, 2006.
Conclusion
This article has developed a conceptual tool that allows us to analyze and deal with the ambivalence and ambiguity we often find in case studies of regional powers or regional hegemons and their foreign policy within their respective region. This tool has also provided indicators for this reconceptualized notion of regional hegemony that allow us to study concrete cases of regional hegemony in a comparative way. While this article has used South Africa's Zimbabwe policy as an illustration, the ambition is clearly to make this conceptualization applicable to other cases as well. I have found sufficient proof of the viability of the concept, in particular for the argument that, by definition, the impacts of the embeddedness of a region, focusing not only on external actors' impact on regional operations but also on the tensions between a regional hegemon's regional and global goals, have to be taken into account.
With regard to the empirical study of South Africa's role in the Zimbabwean crisis, the article has found that it is too easy to make normative statements about the "best" possible outcome in the Zimbabwean crisis and, thus, about the failure of South African regional leadership. When we look more closely at the various indicators of regional hegemony, we can find that, against the odds, South Africa has assumed the role of a regional hegemon in this case. South Africa is, for instance, projecting its interest and values and providing regional public goods, yet not necessarily in the way that powerful global actors want it to. Its policies conform to the larger picture of South Africa's ambition to "fit in' with its southern African neighborhood but to nevertheless exert control over what is happening in its sphere of influence. South Africa has a clear awareness of its material preponderance and follows up this preponderance with hegemonic leadership ambitions. It has also achieved recognition as a key actor in the Zimbabwean crisis on the global level, yet it has risked its international reputation as a good global citizen in the process. International embeddedness thus plays an important role in shaping South Africa's approach to the issue. Above all, international expectations have not helped South Africa to develop its leadership on this issue but have rather forced it to resort to a strategy of denial, as it needed to avoid being seen as a "Western puppet." Thus, "denial" might be an important element of all regional hegemons as predominant power is always seen with suspicion and jealousy. The inclusion of regionally relevant modifications of hegemony theory helps in understanding why South Africa reacted in its specific way in the Zimbabwean crisis. This way of looking at regional power hierarchies also tells us about the limitations and constraints of regional powers in the developing world in particular, as well as their continual need to straddle two worlds-the regional and the global.
